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Based on the ever-increasing interpretation and application of international law by domes-
tic courts, this paper offers an insight into the practices of judicial citation of international
and domestic jurisdictions while adjudicating international criminal law related matters.
The paper considers selected instances of judicial citation and operates a prima facie dis-
tinction between judicial citation as a finding device and as a justification exercise. It is
argued that domestic courts rely on international judicial decisions primarily as a finding
device whilst international case law deals with domestic judicial decisions in the realm of
justification. The analysis of this material triggers reflections on the relevance of judicial
citation for the doctrine of sources of international law, inasmuch as it adds to the forma-
tion of normative expectations on subjects of international law, as well as for a scholarly
conceptualisation of contemporary international law-making.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White published an article
prophetically entitled ‘The Future of International Law is Domestic’.1 Their contribu-
tion drew attention to new mechanisms whereby international law could ‘backstop,
strengthen and compel domestic law and institutions’.2 Indeed, the domestic3 is gain-
ing momentum in international law.4 In particular, domestic courts as appliers and
interpreters of international law catalyse scholarly reflection, insofar as they determine
issues pertaining to international law and, to some extent, perform an international
* The arguments contained in this paper were presented at the ESIL Research Forum held at
Koç University in Istanbul (April 2016). I sincerely thank Professor André Nollkaemper and
Professor Christina Binder for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper,
as well as the Editors of the ESIL SSRN Series of Papers and Professor Ulf Linderfalk for
their remarks on later versions thereof.
1. A-M Slaughter and W Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law is Domestic (or The
European Way of Law)’ (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 327.
2. Ibid 330.
3. Throughout this paper, ‘domestic’ is used interchangeably with ‘national’ and ‘municipal’.
4. See, for example, SWeill,The Role of National Courts in Applying International Humanitarian
Law (OUP, Oxford 2014); H P Aust and G Nolte, The Interpretation of International Law by
Domestic Courts – Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (OUP, Oxford 2016); E Benvenisti,
‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National
Courts’ (2008) 102 AJIL 241; Y Shany, ‘Seeking Domestic Help – The Role of Domestic
Criminal Law in Legitimizing the Work of International Criminal Tribunals’ (2013) 11 JICJ 5.
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judicial function.5 In the realm of international criminal law, Article 1 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)6 epitomises one such enfor-
cement mechanism as it enshrines the principle of complementarity and acknowledges
the primacy of national criminal jurisdictions in the prosecution of international
crimes. This principle is reinforced by the preamble of the Rome Statute which recalls
the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes,7 and emphasises the role of national institutions and measures in
the effective prosecution of those crimes.8
From the establishment of the UN ad hoc tribunals in the 1990s, domestic jurisdic-
tions have experienced a remarkable advance in the adjudication of international
crimes.9 If we accept that domestic judicial decisions on points of international crim-
inal law are on the rise,10 and that the case law on international criminal law will likely
exhibit a domestic pedigree rather than an international one, one may reasonably
anticipate that relevant international and domestic judicial decisions will evidence
new avenues of interaction.11 And yet it seems reductive to explain the increasing
focus on national jurisdictions solely by way of arguments relating to the enforcement
of international law. Plainly, the enforcement of international obligations is crucial for
the involvement of domestic courts in the interpretation and application of interna-
tional law, but it does not explain how national courts reach decisions on points of
international law, nor for what purpose national courts cite prior international and for-
eign national case law. In other words, implementing international obligations incum-
bent on national institutions, including courts, has the potential of explaining why
domestic courts embark on the activity of interpreting and applying international
law but has little to say on why courts refer to their international and/or foreign coun-
terparts’ prior judicial decisions. Similarly, the practice of international courts citing
national judicial decisions cannot simply be explained by resorting to international
customary law arguments, or by reference to the argument regarding the determination
of general principles of international law. Notably, some commentators have examined
this latter phenomenon through the legitimacy lens, arguing that the practice of citing
5. Y Shany, ‘No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a
New International Judiciary’ (2009) 20 EJIL 73, 74. See also B Conforti, International Law and
the Role of Domestic Legal Systems (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 1993); A Roberts,
‘Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing
International Law’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57.
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force
1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90.
7. Ibid preamble, sixth recital.
8. Ibid preamble, fourth recital.
9. During this time, about thirty countries initiated proceedings for international crimes based
on territorial or active nationality jurisdiction. Seven trials were set up in Europe, eleven in Latin
America, four in Asia and ten in Africa. See J Rikhof, ‘Prosecution of International Crimes – a
Historical and Empirical Overview’ (2014) 2 Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal
Justice 108, 114.
10. As noted by William Burke-White, ‘the opportunities for enforcement of international
criminal law are far more promising at the national than at the supranational level.
International criminal law enforcement is effectively migrating from international tribunals to
national courts.’ See W Burke-White, ‘A Community of Courts: Toward a System of
International Criminal Law Enforcement’ (2002) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law 1, 3.
11. This is in consonance with the idea of courts in dialogue with one another. For a thorough
reflection on the point, see A Nollkaemper, ‘The Role of Domestic Courts in the Case Law of the
International Court of Justice’ (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 301.
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domestic judicial decisions by international jurisdictions is embedded in a legitimisa-
tion process.12 Other commentators have pointed instead to the notion of ‘persuasive
value’ in order to explain the phenomenon of judicial citation in international law.13
Judicial citation as an element of interaction between domestic and international
courts is the focus of this paper. It should be no surprise that domestic courts refer to
prior international judicial decisions, nor that international judicial decisions cite prior
relevant national judicial decisions.14 Judicial citation is indeed one of the most seduc-
tive tools the legal profession is trained to resort to. Making reference to a prior judicial
decision can operate as an example of good practice, of quality legal reasoning, of
material recollection, but also as a warning against bad practice, to depart from
prior legal reasoning and propose better solutions to the issue at hand, or as an example
of inaccurate methodologies.15
This paper seeks to offer a fresh perspective on the phenomenon of judicial citation,
particularly by focusing on the additional value this practice can bring to the understand-
ing of contemporary international law-making. In order to conduct this inquiry, I will
focus on judicial decisions on points of international criminal law. This delimitation is
justified as follows. First, international criminal law took shape and developed chiefly
through the activity of international criminal tribunals.16 There hence exists a congruous
body of international case law pertaining to international crimes. International case law
established by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (IMT) and the ad hoc
tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), undisputedly have authority in the
ambit of international criminal law, not least by the simple fact that international crimes
were almost exclusively the domain of those tribunals.17 As expressed by some scholars,
the ‘epistemic community’ of international lawyers traditionally regards the international
judicial fora as the preferred venue for the undertaking of normative development of this
branch of law.18 Secondly, the completion strategy set in motion by the ad hoc tribunals
envisions the closure of those tribunals, which have been at the forefront of international
criminal justice and are still authoritative for many substantive international criminal law
issues. In that event, more emphasis will necessarily be placed on domestic judicial
12. See Y Shany, ‘Seeking Domestic Help – The Role of Domestic Criminal Law in
Legitimizing the Work of International Criminal Tribunals’ (2013) 11 JICJ 5.
13. See, for example, A Zammit Borda, ‘The Notion of “Persuasive Value’” of External
Precedent in International Criminal Law’ (2015) 84 Nordic Journal of International Law 29, 32.
14. See H van der Wilt, ‘National Law. A Small but Neat Utensil in the Toolbox of International
Criminal Tribunals’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 209, 211: ‘After all, “harmoniza-
tion” does not imply full fledged “unification”. But it is incontrovertible that international criminal
tribunals have a normative impact on domestic jurisdictions.’ Ibid 240: ‘Interaction between inter-
national criminal tribunals and domestic jurisdictions is here to stay. It implies the impact of inter-
national criminal tribunals on the law and practice of national jurisdictions, but, reversely, the lasting
influence of domestic law on international tribunals as well.’ .
15. On the point, see J Bell, ‘Researching Globalization: Lessons from Judicial Citations’
(2014) 3 CJICL 961.
16. E van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (OUP, Oxford
2012) 5, referring to the law-making process through judicial interpretation.
17. This statement takes into consideration the event of trials set up within domestic jurisdic-
tions alongside the IMT based on the Control Council Law n. 10, as well as other historical inter-
national crimes trials carried out domestically, such as the Eichmann case in Israel, the Barbie
case in France and others.
18. H Van der Wilt, ‘Domestic Courts’ Contribution to the Development of International
Criminal Law: Some Reflections’ (2013) 46 Israel Law Review 207, 207.
Swinging between finding and justification: judicial citation and international law-making 29
© 2017 The Author Journal compilation © 2017 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/19/2019 12:06:13PM
via Universiteit Leiden / LUMC
actors and on newly international judicial institutions. Thirdly, an increasing number of
domestic jurisdictions became active in the prosecution and adjudication of international
crimes in the wake of the affirmation of the principle of universal jurisdiction attached to
those crimes or par effet of the ratification of the Rome Statute. To this, one may add that
the very existence of a plurality of adjudicatory actors – national and international – in
international criminal law suggests that judicial institutions do not operate in a vacuum
but interact and relate to one another.19 It is contended that this is evidenced inter alia
through a phenomenon of judicial citation in courts’ case law. While interpreting inter-
national law and adjudicating international crimes they all participate in the activity of
shaping international law.20
This article addresses the questions of how and why domestic courts refer to prior
international and foreign domestic judicial decisions;21 whether international judicial
decisions exhibit deference to national judicial decisions, and if so, how this practice
is justified. This paper does not aim to provide a full-fledged taxonomy of interactions
between international and national judicial decisions. Rather, it operates a prima facie
distinction of judicial citations as a finding device or as a justification exercise. The
difference between these two types of judicial citation practices is significant. A
court may turn to prior relevant judicial decisions in the wake of a finding activity,
whereby the content of a certain norm is construed by reference to prior judicial deci-
sions; or it may rather dwell on an activity of justification where the decision on a cer-
tain point of law has already been taken and judicial citation has the mere function of
supporting that finding. Judicial citation as a practice of finding arguably sets out an
element of ‘newness’ which is relevant for understanding the ways in which a judicial
pronouncement creates normative expectations in international law and arguably con-
tributes to the making of international law.
Section 2 considers the notion of international law-making and the role of domestic
judicial decisions in the theory of sources of international law. Caveats in relation to
law-making and law-creating will be duly addressed in this context. Section 3 will
introduce judicial citation as a technique of international law-making in contemporary
international law and it will outline selected instances of judicial citation with a view to
suggesting a prima facie distinction between judicial citation as a finding device or as
a justification exercise. Finally, section 4 will draw conclusions on the revival of
domestic courts in international law-making.
2 CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING: NEW PARADIGMS?
Traditionally, the notion of international law-making points at the methods whereby leg-
ally binding rules are created. Legal scholars have understood these methods to be
19. For a thorough reflection on the modern relationship between domestic and international
courts, see J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between
National and International Law (OUP, Oxford 2007).
20. The notion of international law-making which I use throughout this article is defined below
in looser terms than the process of creating binding rules of international law. To underline this
nuance, I at times refer to the ‘shaping’ of international law or to ‘forming’ international law.
21. This type of judicial reference has also been termed external as opposed to internal juris-
prudence and it is employed here in the same terms. See A Zammit Borda, ‘The Use of
Precedent as Subsidiary Means and Sources of International Criminal Law (2013) 18 Tilburg
Law Review 65, 66. See also E Voeten, ‘Borrowing and Nonborrowing among International
Courts’ (2010) 39 The Journal of Legal Studies 547, 548.
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treaties, custom and general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.22 There are
two main consequences of such an understanding: on the one hand, international law-
making has been conceived as a State-driven activity, thus blurring the distinction between
the lawmakers and the addressees of those very norms;23 on the other hand, international
law-making as a process has been ontologically conflated with the sources of international
law which actually result from law-making processes. This paper stresses the idea that
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute),24 which codi-
fies formally recognised sources of international law,25 does not make any mention of
how those sources are actually formed or shaped in the wide international arena.
Notwithstanding the fact that treaties and custom retain their universal recognition
as sources of international law,26 contemporary legal scholarship has started devoting
attention to other methods, avenues and processes that may generate binding rules or
simply shape the content of pre-existing ones. Some scholarly contributions attempt to
theorise international law-making beyond the contours of the traditional State-driven,
rectius executive-driven, activity and to conceive of international law-making in a
wider sense. For instance, Christine Chinkin and Alan Boyle offer a rather broad defi-
nition of international law-making, arguing that it ‘encompasses the practices which
give form and content to international law’.27 This is the operational definition of inter-
national law-making which this paper subscribes to.
Such a definition has the merit of conceiving of international law-making as a wider
notion than the concept of law made through sources of international law,28 as well as
of opening up to actors other than States, which yet participate in the shaping of inter-
national law. International law-making is thus understood as a polycentric process, dif-
fuse in nature, whereby international law is formed and shaped through the action of a
plurality of actors interpreting and applying international law. Not only States, but also
international organisations, non-State actors, non-governmental organisations and inter-
national judicial and quasi-judicial bodies among others all arguably take part in such
processes. Domestic and international courts undisputedly play an important role in giv-
ing form and content to international law in relation to the increasing judicialisation of
international law and the growing relevance of international law in domestic contexts.
2.1 International law-making and the role of judicial decisions: why citing
matters
International law is increasingly becoming a domestic undertaking. While in the past,
international law emerged before municipal courts in a limited number of instances,
today municipal courts are becoming more engaged with the adjudication of
22. G Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (6th edn, Professional Books Ltd,
Abingdon 1976). See A Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2005) 153.
23. Ibid.
24. Statute of the International Court of Justice 39 AJIL Supp. 215 (1945) (ICJ Statute).
25. J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP, Oxford
2008) 20.
26. As a reflection of this, art 38 of the ICJ Statute is regarded as customary in nature.
27. A Boyle and C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 1.
28. On the distinction between formal and material sources of international law, see
I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP, Oxford 2008) 1–4;
A Pellet, ‘Article 38 of the ICJ Statute’, in C Tomuschat and others (eds), The Statute of the
International Court of Justice – A Commentary (OUP, Oxford 2006) 714 ff.
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international law issues. This appears to be a common proposition among a number of
scholars.29 Nevertheless, this does not per se entail that international law has changed
in nature, paradigms and features. It may simply mean that an international scholar
may turn, more often now than before, to domestic decisions to understand the mean-
ing of a certain rule of international law. Plainly, decisions of domestic courts appear
increasingly to gain momentum in international law.
Traditionally, Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute regards judicial decisions as a subsidiary
means for determining the rules of law. Among judicial decisions, national ones have the
additional value of contributing to the creation of customary international law pursuant to
Article 38(1)(b) ICJ Statute insofar as they are evidence of State practice vis-à-vis a certain
matter of international law.30 From this it follows that international law acknowledges the
role of domestic courts in at least two respects: first, in their capacity as State organs, they
contribute to State practice and, as such, to the formation of customary international law;
secondly, they deliver decisions which are regarded as subsidiary means for interpreting
the rules of law pursuant to Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute.31 In none of these instances can
domestic courts be seen merely as international law appliers or addressees.32 On the con-
trary, international law acknowledges the active role played by domestic courts in giving
form and content to the law qua State organs and through their judicial decisions. As such,
Article 38 ICJ Statute offers guidance to the interpreter by enumerating the sources of
international law. Yet, Article 38 ICJ Statute does not specify how international law is
made, formed and shaped by the relevant agents operating in the field of international
law. To illustrate, Article 38 ICJ Statute points to international custom as a source of inter-
national law, say the absolute prohibition of torture, but does not provide elements to infer
how international custom is formed, that is, how States came to believe themselves to be
legally bound to abide by the absolute prohibition of torture. If we accept that international
law-making is the whole of processes, avenues and methods by which international law is
made, formed and shaped, it is reasonable to conclude that Article 38 ICJ Statute is silent
on international law-making, namely on the techniques, processes and factors which deter-
mine normative expectations in international law.
Interestingly, in the context of international criminal law, the Statute of the
International Criminal Court introduces Article 21 Rome Statute which is derogatory
to the general scope of Article 38 ICJ Statute as it provides for a hierarchy of sources
of international law that the Court shall apply. According to Article 21(1)(c) Rome
Statute, the Court may invoke, failing the investigation into the sources enumerated
in Article 21(1)(a) and (b),33 general principles of law derived ‘from national laws
of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States
29. See, for example, J d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of International Law by
Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the International Legal
Order’ in OK Fauchald and A Nollkaemper (eds), The Practice of International and National
Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2012)
141; Roberts (n 5).
30. International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Third Report on the Identification of Customary
International Law’ (2015) A/CN.4/682, 42-43; ILC, ‘Report on the Work of the Sixty-Eighth
Session’ (2016) A/71/10, 109–10.
31. To this, one may add that national courts’ decisions may help establish the existence of
general principles of law in the terms of art 38(1)(c) ICJ Statute.
32. On the point, see A Tzanakopoulos and C Tams, ‘Domestic Courts as Agents of
Development of International Law’ (2013) 26 LJIL 513, 518.
33. Art 21(1)(a) Rome Statute provides that the Court shall apply in the first place the Statute,
Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; whereas art 21(1)(b) sets forth
32 Cambridge International Law Journal, Vol. 6 No. 1
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that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime.’ This formulation suggests
that the Court would refer to comparative criminal law as a subsidiary source of
law.34 For the sake of examining judicial citation in the ambit of international criminal
law, it is worth noting that Article 21 mentions judicial decisions neither as a source
of law nor as subsidiary means to determine the rules of law. In particular, Article 21 is
silent on whether the Court may refer to the case law laid down by the ad hoc tribu-
nals.35 In the case Prosecutor v Kony et al., Pre-Trial Chamber II established that ‘the
rules and practice of other jurisdictions, whether national or international, are not as
such “applicable law”’.36 Regardless, citing the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence appears
to fall within the ICC judicial practice.37
Judicial citation as a phenomenon in international law suggests reconsidering the
role and preponderance of domestic jurisdictions in the shaping process of interna-
tional law norms and, as such, has the potential of adding value to the understanding
of contemporary avenues of international law-making. Two assumptions lie at the
heart of this presumed link between practices of judicial citation and international
law-making. First, international legal texts may entail a certain degree of indetermi-
nacy and it is especially in the context of judicial decisions that the meaning of
those texts is shaped. In interpreting international rules, judicial decisions fix an instant
image of the existing law which, though relatively stable, undergoes a continuous pro-
cess of content-shaping. As a consequence of international legal texts being indetermi-
nate, judicial decisions necessarily register and underscore an element of novelty in the
law which has not yet been formalised in prior judicial decisions, or in the lex lata.38
The extent to which this novelty results from new evidence of State practice coupled
with opinio juris or from the creative action of the judicial machinery is often a matter
of persuasive argumentation techniques of judges. One of these techniques consists in
citing international and/or foreign domestic judicial decisions to support or discharge a
particular line of legal reasoning.
The second assumption pertains to the authority of judicial decisions in international
law and is closely connected to the first one. From the assumption that international legal
texts may contain an element of indeterminacy, it follows that judicial decisions, among
other tools, may be determinative of the content of international law norms and that they
may henceforth operate as an avenue creating normative expectations vis-à-vis States, in
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established
principles of the international law of armed conflict, as sources that the Court shall apply in
the second place, where appropriate.
34. WA Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute
(OUP, Oxford 2010) 393.
35. V Nehlich, ‘The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in Proceedings Before the ICC’ in C
Stahn and G Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2009) 312–17.
36. See Prosecutor v Kony et al. (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Position on the Decision of
Pre-Trial Chamber II to Redact Factual Descriptions of Crimes in the Warrants of Arrest,
Motion for Reconsideration, and Motion for Clarification) ICC 02/04-01/05 (28 October 2005),
referred in G Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
Treatment of Sources of Law in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’ in C Stahn and G Sluiter (eds),
The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Leiden 2009) 296–7.
37. See, for example, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges) ICC 01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007).
38. See J Pauwelyn, R Wesser and J Wouter, Informal Law Making (OUP, Oxford 2013).
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a similar vein as international treaties or customs do. In other words, international law
is subject to the transformative effect of judicial interpretation performed by courts.
Written laws take shape in the pronouncements of national and international judges,
becoming ‘part and parcel of the legal sense of the community’.39
It is debatable whether judicial decisions of international and municipal jurisdictions
have progressively abandoned their ambit of subsidiary means for determining the rules
of law in favour of a law-creating function.40 If this were so, it would certainly under-
score an important departure from the traditional understanding of judicial decisions
within the sources of international law. For instance, Georg Schwarzenberger
describes judicial decisions as ‘merely evidence of international law or, to be more
exact, law-determining agencies for ascertaining the contents of the actual rules of
international law’.41 Hence, judicial decisions have a declaratory function, not a crea-
tive function. Once it is admitted that judicial decisions exhibit the content of interna-
tional rules and that they are law-determining agencies declaratory of the content of
existing rules, the new body of material produced by domestic and international juris-
dictions warrants constant analysis.
Hersch Lauterpacht in part objects to this view challenging the
[largely accepted opinion] that, under a most favourable construction, municipal decisions
are only evidence of custom, but not a factor creating customary international law (…)
Viewed from another angle, this attitude is the outcome of the rigid separation of the judicial
from the legislative functions in the direction of totally divorcing the work of judges from
law-making proper.42
Lauterpacht theorises instead that municipal courts, qua organs of the State, ‘are a
source of customary international law in so far as they are uniform and in regard to
states the courts of which have participated in the creation of such uniformity.’43
Municipal judgments ‘do not produce express and immediate obligations in the
same manner as a treaty does (…) But their cumulative and indirect effect is to give
expression to the opinio juris of the highest judicial organs of the state.’44
One point is noteworthy. Both scholars agree that the municipal decisions of a sin-
gle State cannot per se create a rule of international law, rather that ‘concordant deci-
sions in pari materia on the part of courts of several states participate in the creation of
a customary rule of international law.’45 Accordingly, the conceptualisation of judicial
decisions as the mere verbal articulation of what the law says is reasonably facing con-
stant challenges in modern international law. In particular, international jurisdictions
are traditionally bestowed with a role of prominence in ‘shaping the structure and
content of international law’46 and have considerably influenced some areas of
39. H Lauterpacht quoted in M Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (CUP,
Cambridge 1996) 1.
40. See, for example, J Powderly and S Darcy (eds), Judicial Creativity at the International
Criminal Tribunals (OUP, Oxford 2010).
41. G Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (6th edn, Professional Books Ltd,
Abingdon 1976) 18.
42. H Lauterpacht, ‘Decisions of Municipal Courts as a Source of International Law’ (1929) 10




46. F Zabiyev, ‘Judicial Activism in International Law’ (2012) 3 Journal of International
Dispute Settlement 247, 248.
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international law, including international criminal law, human rights law, and interna-
tional trade law. The questions raised by this shift of understanding are whether there
is a distinction to be made between international and domestic judicial decisions, and
under which conditions a judicial decision exceeds the boundaries of its interpretive
activity to perform a law-creating function.
This problématique of distinguishing between law-creation and law-application is a
canonical one in international law doctrine.47 According to more contemporary com-
mentators, judicial decisions may be elevated to law-creating processes inasmuch as
they make international law by interpreting international law.48 In particular, it is sub-
mitted that ‘[p]ast interpretations generate normative expectations’49 and that ‘the inter-
action between a number of actors in a transnational legal process is “jusgenerative”’.50
The analysis of judicial decisions of municipal and international jurisdictions is
germane for understanding whether and, if so, how domestic courts resort to prior
international judicial decisions relevant for the matter to decide; whether and, if so,
how domestic judicial decisions are used in the context of international judicial
decisions; and what is suggested by the instances of judicial cross-reference from
the viewpoint of international law-making.
3 JUDICIAL CITATION: FINDING DEVICE OR JUSTIFICATION EXERCISE?
In this section, I seek to examine selected instances of judicial citation in order to oper-
ate a prima facie distinction between judicial citation as a finding device or as a jus-
tification exercise. As I mentioned earlier, the paper does not provide a full-fledged
taxonomy of judicial citation. Rather it utilises the pair finding/justification as a
prima facie classification of selected instances of judicial citation practices. The latter
will offer a starting point to reflect on the extent to which international criminal juris-
dictions have cited prior judicial decisions of domestic courts and for which purpose,
as well as to what extent national jurisdictions deciding on international criminal law
matters have cited prior international case law. This inquiry will enable me to operate
an embryonic test on the following hypotheses: i) domestic courts cite international
judicial decisions primarily in a realm of finding, as a reflection of the authority
retained by international judicial pronouncements in international law matters; ii) inter-
national jurisdictions cite domestic case law as a justification technique. Although this
investigation considers a narrow sample of judicial decisions, the benefit of it is to trig-
ger fresh reflections on the practices of judicial citations, rather than providing conclu-
sive answers on this phenomenon.51 Should these hypotheses not be verified, this
47. See, for example, A von Bogdandy and I Venzke, ‘Beyond Dispute: International Judicial
Institutions as Lawmakers’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 979, 985 citing H Kelsen, Law and
Peace in International Relations (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1942).
48. See I Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law (OUP, Oxford 2012).
49. I Venzke, ‘Contemporary Theories and International Law-making’, in CM Broelmann and
Y Radi (eds), Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International Law-Making
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2014) 9–10.
50. Ibid 14 referring to R Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4;
ME O’Connell, ‘New International Legal Process’ (2004) 36 Studies in Transnational Legal
Policy 79, 104.
51. This article is part of an ongoing doctoral project entitled ‘New Perspectives in
International Law-Making: The Dynamics of Judicial Citation in International Criminal Law’
(Working Title).
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study will still enable me to reflect on the similar/dissimilar attitude of international
and national jurisdictions adjudicating on international criminal law matters, as well
as ponder on whether the centre of authority concerned with the interpretation and
application of international criminal law is possibly and progressively migrating
towards domestic courts.
3.1 Domestic and international judicial decisions in international case law
In terms of chronology, international criminal jurisdictions started citing domestic case
law earlier than domestic courts embarked on the same enterprise of referring to their inter-
national criminal counterparts. One such example is traceable in the case law of the
ICTY.52 In the seminal Tadić decision on jurisdiction,53 the ICTY Appeals Chamber
makes reference to the Danish case Prosecution v Refik Saric for the purposes of clar-
ifying whether the notion of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions may
extend beyond the context of international armed conflicts.54 The Chamber is already
clear on the answer to this question, namely that the notion of grave breaches and the
obligations stemming therefrom upon States only apply in the context of international
armed conflicts.55 However, the Chamber refers to contra evidence, with the purpose
of underscoring elements of State practice which would potentially allow the application
of the notion of grave breaches and the obligations of States attached thereto, regardless
of the nature of the conflict:56
However, we are aware that this conclusion may appear not to be consonant with recent trends of
both States practice and the whole doctrine of human rights (…) which tend to blur in many
respects the traditional dichotomy between international law and civil strife. In this connection
the Chamber notes with satisfaction the statement in the amicus curiae brief of the Government
of the U.S. [which] provides the first indication of a possible change in the opinio juris of
States (…) Other elements pointing in the same direction can be found in the provisions of
the German Military Manual whereby grave breaches of international humanitarian law include
some violations of common Article 3 (…) One can also mention a recent judgment of a Danish
Court. On 25 November 1994 the Third Chamber of the Eastern Division of the Danish High
Court delivered a judgment on a person accused of crimes committed together with a number
of Croatian military police on 5 August 1993 in the Croatian prison camp of Dretelj in Bosnia
(The Prosecution v. Refik Saric, unpublished (Den.H. Ct. 1994). The Court explicitly acted on
the basis of the ‘grave breaches’ provisions of the Geneva Conventions (…) without however
raising the preliminary question of whether the alleged offenses had occurred within the frame-
work of an international rather than an internal armed conflict (…) This judgment indicates that
some national courts are also taking the view that the ‘grave breaches’ system may operate
regardless of whether the armed conflict is international or internal.57
52. The present contribution analyses a limited number of cases drawn from international case
law databases, that is, the Oxford Public International Law Reports (OPIL) and the International
Crimes Database of the Asser Institute. However, the author considers this sample of cases illus-
trative of broader practices.
53. Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on





36 Cambridge International Law Journal, Vol. 6 No. 1
© 2017 The Author Journal compilation © 2017 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/19/2019 12:06:13PM
via Universiteit Leiden / LUMC
The Danish case Prosecution v Refik Saric is regarded by the Chamber as an element
of State practice on the same strength of the US statement and of the relevant provi-
sions of the German Military Manual. From a legal viewpoint, this overview may
resemble an attempt to reconstrue a norm of international customary law through
State practice and opinio juris elements. However, this would have been relevant,
had the Chamber not yet determined the issue ab initio. What seems a plausible read-
ing of the Chamber’s methodology is instead that the Danish judicial decision is
invoked to show, and possibly promote, a progressive approach to the interpretation
of the notion of grave breaches. In this way, the Chamber’s exercise is a device of
justification to explain departure from State practice which is not yet reflective of
the majority of States or even consistent.
Likewise, in Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija,58 the ICTY Trial Chamber answered
the question of whether or not the prohibition of torture had attained the status of a
customary norm of international law. After recalling relevant conventional instru-
ments, as well as domestic law in force in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
which proscribed torture,59 the Chamber operates in passing a noteworthy exercise,
contending that:
The Trial Chamber does not need to determine whether the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols passed into customary law in their entirety, as was recently held by
the Constitutional Court of Colombia, or whether, as seems more plausible, only the most
important provisions of these treaties have acquired the status of general international law.60
The question before the bench offered the Chamber the opportunity to review the find-
ing of the Colombian Constitutional Court about an issue of international law, namely
the crystallisation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the two 1977 Additional
Protocols into customary international law.61 As in the Tadić decision, the outcome
is twofold: on the one hand, the outreach of the Colombia Constitutional Court’s deci-
sion arguably expands and acquires a wider resonance; on the other hand, the Chamber
shows caution in aligning itself with the findings of the Colombian Court, granting
customary status to norms which presumably have not attained such a broad acknowl-
edgment. With regard to the latter, again this is an instance where judicial citation
operates as justification.
In the Decision on the confirmation of charges against Lubanga Dylo,62 the Pre-Trial
Chamber was confronted with the interpretation of the notions of international armed
conflict and non-international armed conflict. The Chamber recalls that the Rome
Statute does not provide for a definition of international armed conflict and, in confor-
mity with Article 21 of the Rome Statute on the applicable law, will refer to applicable
treaties and principles and rules of international law to determine the issues.63
Interestingly, in discussing the internationalisation of a non-international armed
58. Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija (Judgment) ICTY-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998).
59. Ibid 134–6.
60. Ibid 137.
61. In the case Prosecutor v Ramalingam/Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Judgment) The
Hague District Court, The Netherlands, Case Nr. BU9716 (21 October 2011), the Dutch
Court corroborates this finding, maintaining that APII has assumed the character of customary
international law.
62. Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC
01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007).
63. Ibid 205.
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conflict as a consequence of the intervention of agents acting on behalf of a foreign
State, the Chamber refers to the ‘overall control test’ developed by the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case64 and affirms that this is the standard to be
used to establish whether armed forces are acting on behalf of another State.65
Judicial citation is resorted to here with a view to determine the meaning of ‘interna-
tional armed conflict’, hence as a finding device.
As to the determination of the existence of a non-international armed conflict, the
Chamber interprets the letter of Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute in light of ICTY
jurisprudence. In particular, the elements of duration and organisation contained in
the expression ‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’ of Article 8(2)(e)
is formulated according to the wording of the Appeals Chamber Decision in
Tadić,66 not in conformity with the formulation of Article 1 of the Additional
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. From this it follows that the drafters
of the Rome Statute upheld the standard spelt out in the ICTY rather than adhering
to the letter of the Additional Protocol II (APII). This is an eloquent instance, insofar
as it demonstrates the impact which a judicial decision – subsequently upheld in a
number of cases – may produce on the understanding of a provision of international
law, namely Article 1 APII.
3.2 International and foreign domestic cases in domestic case law
The analysis of domestic cases also evidences the practice of judicial citation of prior
international and foreign domestic judicial decisions. Two domestic cases, both con-
cerned with the crime of genocide, are scrutinised. The comparison of these two
instances grants us the opportunity to illustrate divergences and similarities in the reason-
ing of national judges confronted with a crime under international law. The first case was
brought against Mr François Bazaramba and was adjudicated by a Finnish District Court
in 2011 based on the universality principle.67 Mr Bazaramba was charged with genocide
for having killed Tutsis, ordered the death of Tutsis and incited the commission of such
killings in Nyakizu commune in 1994, with the intent to destroy in whole or in part the
Rwandan Tutsis as a group.68 The legal basis for prosecuting acts of genocide before a
Finnish Court is the Finnish Criminal Code which since 1974 incorporates the necessary
provisions to criminalise and punish acts of genocide as defined by Article 2 of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (‘Genocide
Convention’).69 As rightly recalled by the Court, the criminalisation of the crime of
64. Ibid 210, referring to Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) ICTY-94-1-A (15 July 1999) 84, 137.
65. Ibid 211.
66. Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction) ICTY-94-1-A (2 October 1995) 70.
67. Prosecutor v François Bazaramba (Judgment) Porvoo District Court (now District Court
of Itä-Uusimaa), Finland, 10/423, Docket Nr. R09/404 (11 June 2011) 29.
68. Mr Bazaramba was of Hutu ethnicity, living in Nyakizu commune and, because of his active
involvement in local politics and his vicinity to the mayor of Nyakizu, allegedly held at that time a
de facto authority over the Hutu in Nyakizu. Further, Mr Bazaramba was ‘in a position to acquire
the weapons used in the genocide and to give monetary rewards to the Hutu who took part in the
killings.’
69. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted
9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277.
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genocide is based on the Genocide Convention to which Finland is bound under inter-
national law.70 In appraising the case, the Court clarifies that the provisions of the
Convention are not as such binding on the Court although Finland is a party to the
1948 Genocide Convention. This entails that, formally, the Court is not bound to
apply the provisions contained in the international convention but is only bound to
apply the criminal provisions contained in the Finnish Criminal Code which materially
reflect the provisions of the Genocide Convention.71
The Court’s reasoning articulates itself in three steps. First, the Court acknowledges
the lack of ‘living justice’, namely the scant existence of Finnish domestic case law inter-
preting the letter of the Genocide Convention72 from which to infer the constitutive ele-
ments of the crime of genocide. Secondly, the Court turns to international law
instruments, namely the Genocide Convention and the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties,73 to find guidance in the interpretation of the substance of the consti-
tutive elements of the crime of genocide. Thirdly, despite reaffirming the importance of
domestic sources of law as the starting point of its appraisal of the case, the Finnish
Court acknowledges the ‘heightened’ international nature of a genocide trial in a domes-
tic court and the opportunity to refer to international case law and doctrine. In this
regard, the Court recalls that
[t]he points of departure in Finnish criminal proceedings are always the application of the
Finnish Criminal Code and the use of Finnish sources of law. Since in the manners recalled
above, the genocide trial may be deemed to have a heightened international nature, the Dis-
trict Court has also studied the development and dogmatics of international criminal law as
well as the case law of international criminal courts and tribunals.74
Notably, the Court refers to the case law established by the international tribunals
(ICTY, Prosecutor v Jelisić75 and ICTR, Prosecutor v Bagosora76), to the writings
of renowned international scholars in the field of international criminal law
(Gerhard Werle) and to the French Criminal Code (Article 211-1) in order to establish
whether the international definition of genocide requires the prosecution to prove the
existence of a plan or genocidal policy (as claimed by the defendant).77 Plainly, this
instance of judicial citation constitutes an exercise of finding whereby the Court
becomes cognisant of the ways in which genocide has been adjudicated in prior inter-
national judicial decisions, and regarded by legal scholars and in foreign domestic
criminal systems. From a legal point of view, coupling together international case
law and reference to the teachings of the most highly qualified scholars in the field
appears in consonance with Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute, to the extent that they are
used as subsidiary means to determine the law. On the contrary, reference to the
70. Ibid 28.
71. Finland is regarded as a dualist legal system. See M Scheinin (ed), International Human
Rights Norms in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 1996) 14.
72. Prosecutor v François Bazaramba (n 67) 29.
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331.
74. Prosecutor v François Bazaramba (n 67) 29.
75. Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgment) ICTY- IT-95-10-A (5 July 2001).
76. Prosecutor v Théoneste Bagosora et al (judgment) ICTR-98-41-T (18 December 2008).
77. Ibid 30. Interestingly, the Finnish Court relies on the findings of the ICTR (ICTR-98-44-T,
Judgment of 11 December 2006) to determine the existence of a genocide in Rwanda in 1994, de
facto taking judicial notice of the ICTR findings. See ibid 33.
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sole French Criminal Code proves ambiguous from the perspective of the sources
of law.
The Finnish Court’s reasoning articulates itself in the realm of finding, as the Court
declares its necessity to look into prior adjudicated cases in order to find guidance on
the interpretation of the crime of genocide. Notably, reference to international judicial
decisions is used to interpret the relevant provisions of the Finnish Criminal Code
which are reflective of those of the Genocide Convention. Hence, international and
foreign domestic references are drawn upon ultimately to interpret Finnish domestic
provisions on genocide. This is made possible by qualifying the crime as an interna-
tional crime with a ‘heightened nature’. Remarkably, the language spoken by the
Finnish Court is ultimately an international language,78 accessible to any other domes-
tic court and overcoming the insularity of domestic law when adjudicating a crime
under international law.
A similarly recent case, R. v Munyaneza,79 decided upon by a Canadian District
Court presents analogies with the Finnish case illustrated above.80 This is the first gen-
ocide trial adjudicated in a criminal court of Canada based on the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 24) which came into force on 23
October 2000 (the Act).81 The case is relevant for the phenomenon of judicial citation
because it deals with the notion of ‘intentional killing’ (first count of genocide) men-
tioned in international conventional instruments but not present in the Canadian
Criminal Code.82 As observed by the Court, the use of the term ‘intentional killing’
in the Act differs from ‘culpable homicide as murder’ in the Criminal Code, therewith
implying that ‘the Canadian legislator wished to refer to the definition of “intentional
killing” found in international law and its jurisprudence’.83
On 19 October 2005 Mr Desiré Munyaneza, a Rwandan national residing in
Canada, was charged, inter alia, with two counts of genocide by intentional killing
and through causing serious bodily or mental harm to the Tutsi people committed
in the Prefecture of Butare in Rwanda between 1 April 1994 and 31 July 1994,
with the intent to destroy the Tutsi in whole or in part, as defined in subsections
6(3) and 6(4) of the Act.84 The definition of genocide provided by subsection 6(3)
of the Act reads as follows:
an act or omission committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an identifiable
group of persons, as such, that at the time and in the place of its commission constitutes gen-
ocide within the meaning of customary international law or conventional international law or
78. On the point, see E Benvenisti and GW Downs, ‘National Courts, Domestic Democracy,
and the Evolution of International Law’ (2009) 20 EJIL 59, 66.
79. R. v Munyaneza [2009] RJQ 1432.
80. Although Canada is party to the Rome Statute, this is not an instance of complementarity
since the case concerns acts committed in Rwanda in 1994, before the Rome Statute came into
force in 2002. It is instead an instance of universal jurisdiction casting light on how the domestic
judge reads and applies prior international case law.
81. Canada, although traditionally regarded as a dualist system, has embraced a more monist-
oriented approach. For an overview of this development, see S Beaulac, ‘Recent Developments
on the Role of International Law in Canada Statutory Interpretation’ (2004) 25 Statute Law
Review 19.
82. R. v Munyaneza (n 79) 81.
83. Ibid 82.
84. Ibid 69.
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by virtue of its being criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations.85
The judgment recalls that the Genocide Convention is the foundation of treaty law as it
pertains to genocide, the definition of which (Article 2 of the Convention) has been
incorporated verbatim in the Statute of the ICTY and of the ICTR, as well as the
Rome Statute.
With a view to determining the content of the law at the time of the commission of
the alleged crimes, the Canadian judge makes reference to the Musegera case, a pre-
vious case adjudicated in Canada, asserting that even without a conventional defini-
tion, the crime of genocide in 1994 was in contravention of all the peremptory
norms of customary international law.86 In addition, the court in Munyaneza finds
assistance in the foundational instruments of international tribunals (including the
ICC to which Canada is party) and in the case law of the ICTY and ICTR to interpret
the meaning of ‘intentional killing’ (Prosecutor v Brdanin87). The same approach is
followed to ascertain the meaning of ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ for which the
Court also explicitly refers to the ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence (Prosecutor v
Akayesu88 and Prosecutor v Kajelijeli89).
Interestingly, the Canadian Court refers and draws authority from both ad hoc tri-
bunals, not merely from the ICTR, which was specifically mandated to deal with the
Rwandan genocide. As noted by some commentators, ‘international criminal law and
jurisprudence acted as guidance for the court in defining those offences [“intentional
killing”, “serious bodily and mental harm”, etc…]’,90 evidencing a significant degree
of deference to the ad hoc tribunals’ case law. In a similar way to the Bazaramba case,
the Munyaneza judgment denotes an ‘internationally-oriented, outward-looking view
that the CAHWC [Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000]
clearly demands of Canadian law’, although more willing to cite relevant domestic
case law than foreign national precedents.91
Once again, judicial citation of prior international judicial decisions responds to find-
ings undertaken rather than justificatory practices. An explanation thereof may reside in
the authority traditionally retained by international jurisdictions for interpreting and
applying international law. National courts emerge as reluctant to take up the challenge
of interpreting and applying international law without citing prior relevant case law.
4 CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECT FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION
This contribution has shown that, despite the limited selection of judicial decisions, both
international and domestic judicial decisions exhibit judicial citation on points of inter-
national criminal law. The cases analysed allow us to advance a preliminary claim:
whereas in domestic judicial decisions judicial citation prima facie results in an exercise
of finding, international case law tends to invoke domestic judicial decisions as a
85. Ibid 70.
86. Musegera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] 2 SCR 100.
87. Prosecutor v Brdanin (Trial Chamber judgment) ICTY IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004).
88. Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial Chamber judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998).
89. Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Trial Chamber judgment) ICTR-98-44A-T (1 December 2003).
90. RJ Currie and I Stancu, ‘R. v Munyaneza: Pondering Canada’s First Core Crimes
Conviction’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 829, 848.
91. Ibid 850.
Swinging between finding and justification: judicial citation and international law-making 41
© 2017 The Author Journal compilation © 2017 Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 08/19/2019 12:06:13PM
via Universiteit Leiden / LUMC
justification device. Given space constraints and the limited instances of case law ana-
lysed, these conclusions are to be confined to this pilot study and would require further
investigation to be capable of generalisation or formulated in absolute terms.
As demonstrated by the Bazaramba case in Finland, citing international judicial
decisions and foreign domestic law sources responds to the ‘heightened’ nature of
crimes under international law, which result from violations of peremptory norms.
The analysis of domestic judicial citation displays a prima facie deference to interna-
tional judicial decisions for the interpretation of substantive rules of international crim-
inal law. Articulated in the realm of finding, international judicial decisions are indeed
referred to as guidance to the interpretation of international criminal law, or – more
accurately – to a widely-supported interpretation of international law rules.
On the contrary, judicial citation in the selected instances of international judicial
decisions manifests itself as a device of justification, whereby the international
judge appears to invoke prior domestic judicial decisions to justify departure from
their findings but at the same time to promote a more progressive interpretation of
the same rules of international law.
Considering the increasing role that national jurisdictions will play in the adjudica-
tion of international crimes in the future, more specifically the increasing involvement
of domestic jurisdictions in the interpretation and application of international law, it is
suggested that the dynamics of judicial citation will likely pave the way towards inter-
domestic judicial cross-references, signalling the migration of authority from interna-
tional jurisdictions to domestic jurisdictions.
In terms of international law-making, instances of judicial citation as a finding exercise
are germane to foster the scholarly debate of how international judicial decisions shape
international law and create expectations on domestic courts qua State organs regarding
how to decide a certain matter of international law. Noticeably in the ICTY case law,
such normative expectations do not seem to be generated, at least not with regard to
these instances, by domestic judicial decisions. Further investigating domestic judicial
decisions on points of international criminal law – and international law at large –
may be revelatory of practices of mutual interaction (including influence) between inter-
national and domestic courts and among domestic courts themselves, underscoring
elements of continuity between the international and the municipal law sphere rather
than separation, as emphasised by the classic monism-dualism opposition.92
In other words, investigating the practices of judicial citation has the potential of
enhancing the comprehension of how a certain understanding of an international
law rule is formed. In other words, citing a given prior judicial decision, be it national
or international, is associated with processes whereby national and international juris-
dictions perceive of themselves as normatively compelled to align their decisions with
or depart from that prior case law.
92. G Gaja, ‘Dualism – A Review’ in J Nijman and A Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on
the Divide Between National and International Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 56.
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